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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78A-3102(3).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE L: Did the trial court err in construing the Agreement to restrict the
obligation of Colbert to pay $90,000.00 only if Colbert fully developed the subject
real property to the specific exclusion of the circumstance where Colbert sold or
assigned the property? Standard of review and preservation: All conclusions of
law are reviewed for correctness, granting the district court no deference. WebBank
v. American General Annuity Serv. Corp., 54 P.3d 1139, 1143 (Utah 2002); Dansie
v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowner Assoc, 92 P.3d 162, 164 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).
The interpretation of a contract is an issue of law which the appellate courts review
for correctness, giving no deference to the ruling of the trial court. Encon Utah,
LLC, v. Flour Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P.3d 263, 269 (Utah 2009). The
application of law to the facts is a mixed question of law and fact which the appeals
court reviews for correctness, granting the trial court discretion in its application of
the law to a given fact situation. Covey v. Covey, 80P.3d553,558 (Utah Ct. App.
2003).

Where the language of the contract is deemed ambiguous, the interpretation

of the contract becomes a factual matter and the review of appeals court is strictly
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limited. Hillcrest Investment v. Sandy City, 2010 Utah Ct. App 201, f 7. This issue
was preserved through evidence presented at trial and was again raised in Florence's
Motion for a New Trial. (R412 1 )

ISSUE II: Did the trial court err in finding Colbert's interpretation of the
Agreement's terms to be reasonable and more consistent with the language
contained within the Agreement and the context surrounding its creation? Standard
of review and preservation: Questions of fact are reviewed for clear error and may
be set aside only if against the clear weight of the evidence. Dansie v. Hi-Country
Estate Homeowners Assoc, 92 P.3d 162 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). This issue was
preserved through evidence presented at trial and was again raised in Florence's
Motion for a New Trial. (R412)

APPLICABLE STATUTES, RULES, AND ORDINANCES
There are no applicable statutes, rules or ordinances.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course ofproceedings, and disposition below
This contract case was tried to the Court on May 7, 2009. At the conclusion
1

R cites refer to the court record. TR cites refer to the trial transcript.
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of the trial the Court asked each party to prepare proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The Court entered its "Ruling" on August 9, 2009, dismissing
Plaintiffs claim. (R 385-393) Florence appealed the Court's ruling, but since the
Court's ruling did not expressly state that no other order is necessary, the appeals
court, on its own motion, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
the Court's ruling was not an appealable final order. (R 406) Plaintiff filed a motion
for a new trial. (R 412-442) On March 29, 2010, the trial Court entered its "Final
Ruling," denying Plaintiffs request for a new trial and dismissing Plaintiffs claims
and this appeal was taken. (R 514-524 and Appendix "A")
Statement of Facts
In August, 2005, Chad Colbert obtained a Real Estate Purchase Contract
(REPC) interest in a parcel of property in Idaho. (R 28-34, 53-59, 212-218 and
Appendix "B") The party named in the REPC is "Chad Colbert and or Assigns." A
typed clause of the REPC reads as follows:
"$100,000 EARNEST MONEY TO BECOxME NONREFUNDABLE
AFTER 30 DAY DUE DILENGENCE (sic) PERIOD STARTING
THE DAY AFTER THE CONTRACT IS OFFICIALLY SIGNED
BY BOTH PARTIES. ALL WATER AND MINERAL RIGHTS TO
REMAIN WITH THE PROPERTY. SELLER TO CLOSE ON
PROPERTY 30 DAYS AFTER THE 30 DAY DUE DILLEGENCE
(sic) PERIOD."
The REPC was signed by Seller on August 30, 2005. On September 21 st ,

3

Colbert, together with his partner, Greg Young, asked Florence for a loan of
$90,000.00. (TR10-17; 64-69) A written agreement entitled "escrow money
agreement" (Agreement) was signed by Florence and Colbert and Florence paid
$90,000.00. (P l 2 and Appendix "C"; TR 14-16) The entire text of the Agreement
reads as follows:
Escrow money agreement entered into this 21 st day of September 2005
On Property at 1788 Highway 95 Council ID, 83612 Parcel #
R3283900000
This escrow money agreement between Chad Colbert & Greg Young
("the borrowers") and Casey Florence ("the lender") is for $90,000.00
ninety thousand dollars.
Terms:
Chad Colbert & Greg Young, jointly and severally promise to pay the
original amount of $90,000.00 together with interest at the rate of 12%
annually with a 3 point fee if the project is not closed by October 24,
2005 which date is the agreed repayment date. If borrowers close said
project, borrowers agree to pay the lender this original loan amount
plus an additional $90,000.00. (ninety thousand dollars), payable 14
days after closing.
The Agreement was signed only by Chad Colbert and Casey Florence. On
November 14, 2005, Colbert assigned his entire interest in the REPC, and the
subject real property for $1,045,000.00. (D 3; D 4; TR 79, 82-83) On November
30th Colbert paid Florence $100,000. (P 2; TR 18) This payment was in excess of
interest at 12% per annum plus three points, calculated as of November 30th, but is
2

P cites to Plaintiffs exhibit. D cites to Defendant's exhibit.
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obviously less than $180,000.00. The issue in this case is whether this payment
satisfied Colbert's obligations under the agreement or whether Colbert owes
Florence an additional $80,000.00.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's construction of the written agreement fails to give meaning
to all of its express terms, fails to construe the agreement as a whole, and constitutes
a rewriting of the agreement. The trial court's finding that Colbert's interpretation
of the agreement as a "typical hard money loan" is more reasonable and consistent
with the intent of the parties is not supported by the evidence presented at trial and
is clearly erroneous when viewed in the light of all the contract terms, facts and
evidence presented in this case.

ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE AGREEMENT
TO REQUIRE COLBERT TO PAY $180,000.00 ONLY IF COLBERT
OBTAINED THE FINANCING TO FULLY DEVELOP THE
SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY.

In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court held that the Agreement required
Colbert to repay $180,000.00 only if he obtained "the required financing to purchase
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the Property and develop the project." (R 522-523 and Appendix "A") Because
Colbert assigned the property for $1,045,000.00, instead of purchasing and
developing it, Plaintiffs claim for the unpaid $80,000.00 was dismissed. To reach
this conclusion, it was necessary for the court to ignore the language of the
Agreement designating it as an "escrow money agreement" and designating October
24, 2005, as the "agreed repayment date." This conclusion specifically excludes the
closing of the assignment of the property as a closing of the project.

Construing the Agreement as a Whole

This is a case of contract interpretation. It can be resolved using the basic
rules of contract interpretation. The obligation of the court is to find the intent of
the parties. The court looks first, "to the four corners of the agreement to determine
the intentions of the parties." Central Florida Investments, Inc., v. Parkwest Assoc,
40 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2002) Where there is ambiguity in the writing, the court
may access parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity. However, the mere availability
of parol evidence does not free the court to jettison the writing. The court is
obligated to seek an outcome that gives meaning to all of the terms of the
agreement. Encon Utah, LLC, v. Flour Ames Kraemer, LLC, 210 P.3d 263, 269
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(Utah 2009) As the court said in Encon, "In interpreting a contract, we look for a
reading that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision
meaningless."
In Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah 1982), the
court had access to both the testimony of the parties and the written agreement. The
Supreme Court noted, "When a question arises regarding a written document, the
first source of the inquiry must be the document itself, considered in its entirety." Id.
at 749. In determining the intention of the parties the Court is obligated to "examine
the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other and give a reasonable
construction of the contract as a whole." Gillmor v. Macey, 121 P.3d 57, 65 (Utah
Ct. App. 2005) As the Appeals Court said in Gillmor, "[i]t is axiomatic that a
contract should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its
terms, which terms should be given effect if it is possible to do so." Id. The court
is not free to ignore specific written terms or to rewrite the agreement to obtain a
result the court finds "reasonable."
In this case, the written Agreement designates October 24, 2005 as the
"agreed repayment date." The agreement is said to be an "escrow money
agreement." Florence loaned $90,000 which was used as earnest money under a
Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC). The REPC provided that the earnest money
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was to become "nonrefundable" after 30 days. Florence understood the term
"escrow money agreement" to mean that if his loan of $90,000.00 was returned to
him before it became non-refundable under the terms of the REPC, Colbert need
only pay points and interest. (TR 16-17; 23, 24; 84-85) Florence also understood
the Agreement to mean that if his money was repaid before October 24 , Colbert's
obligation was limited to points and interest. (TR 39-40) Rather than being returned
out of escrow, Florence's money was used to secure the interest in the property
which Colbert eventually assigned at a profit. (P 3) The court's conclusion, allows
Colbert to pay only points and interest even though repaid after October 24 and
after the obligation under the REPC had become non-refundable, from the proceeds
of the assignment, giving no effect to either the deadline or the escrow language.
Nor does the court's ruling explain how or why this should be the case, except to
assert that the terms "closing" and "project" are susceptible to more than one
meaning. No mention is made in the court's findings or conclusions as to how the
repayment date or escrow terms were to be understood.

The Ordinary Meaning of Terms.
Furthermore, the court's conclusion restricts "closing" from meaning the
closing that actually did bring this project to a close when Colbert assigned the
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property. (D 3, D 4) The party designated as buyer in the REPC was "Chad Colbert
and or Assigns." The usual and normal meaning of closing would have included the
closing of the assignment of the REPC as well as the closing of the purchase of the
property unless specifically restricted. Nothing in the written agreement eliminates
this interpretation.
In construing terms, the ordinary meaning of the terms is to be used unless it
is shown that the restrictive meaning is "so generally known in the community that.
• .. actual individual knowledge of it may be inferred." Frigaliment Importing Co.,
v. B.N.S. International Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) quoting
9 WlGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) 2464. In 1924, the Utah Supreme Court
expressed the rule as follows: "the best construction is that which is made by
viewing the subject of the contract, as the mass of mankind would view it; for it may
be safely assumed that such was the aspect in which the parties themselves viewed
it." Udy v. Jensen, 111 P.597 (Utah 1924) See also CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, Revised
Ed 1998, Volume 5, Ch. 24.
The written agreement between the parties provides that Florence is entitled
to $90,000.00, "if borrowers close said project." A real estate closing did take place
where Colbert assigned the subject property for $1,000,000.00. (P 3) This
assignment disposed of all of Colbert's interest in all the subject real property. The
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trial court's ruling excludes this transaction from qualifying as a closing of the
project, holding that, "Colbert did not close on the project (obtain the required
financing to purchase the Property and develop the project) but assigned his
purchase interest.... " (R 522-523; Appendix "A") Clearly this transaction would
qualify in normal usage of the terms as a closing of the project. Colbert himself
understood this to be a closing. (TR 79, 87-89; see also P 3 copy of Seller's Closing
Statement) Only if a highly restrictive interpretation is imposed on the terms
"closing" and "project" would the closing of the assignment not qualify as a closing
of the project. Yet no such restrictive interpretation is even hinted at in the terms of
the written agreement. And Colbert testified that he never informed Florence of his
restricted interpretation. (TR 85-87) The mere narration by Colbert of his plans for
the property did not remove the possibility that an assignment of the property might
take place. However the term project is defined, it cannot be denied that the
assignment of Colbert's entire interest in the real property brought this project to a
close. In Vulcan Steel Corp,, v.Markosian, 462 P.2d 166, (Utah 1969) the court
held that the intent of the parties must be determined by an "objective and
reasonable construction of the whole contract." Any objective meaning for the term
"close" would include the close which actually took place, especially when
considered in light of the other contract terms regarding deadline for the repayment
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of the money. Colbert's subjective intent regarding the development of the property
should not be the definition of closing.

Rewriting the Agreement,
The trial court's ruling can be seen as an understandable attempt to give
effect to the sensation that $90,000.00 is too much money to pay for a loan of only
some 70 days duration.3 Where the intention of the parties to enter into an
agreement requiring a 100% premium is clear, as it is in this case, the court is not
free to rewrite the agreement to conform to what the court might view as reasonable.
This is especially true where the court is viewing the transaction after the fact,
where the pressures and risks have dissipated and the consequences are known.
Nonetheless, when the Court sought to divine what might be reasonable, it strayed
from its duty in this case which is to discern and implement the intent of the parties.
Corbin on Contracts states:
A court is never justified in altering or perverting the language in
order to produce a result that it regards as more just and equitable.
Extrinsic evidence is admissible to aid in the process of interpretation,
3

In its initial Findings of Fact and conclusions of law, the trial court stated that
Colbert's interpretation was more "commercially reasonable." (R 389). After
Florence's initial appeal and motion for new trial pointed out that there was no
definition of commercially reasonable in the record, the court deleted this language
from its Final Ruling.
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to determine the meaning that the parties actually gave to a term, and
to expound and enforce the contract that the parties actually intended
to make. Such evidence is never relevant or admissible when offered
for the purpose of establishing another meaning or intention and to
expound and enforce a different contract.
Corbin on Contracts, Revised Ed. 1998, Vol. 5 § 24.6, p 29.
In Hal Taylor Assoc, v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982),
the court stated the Utah law on this matter as follows: "It is a long-standing rule in
Utah that persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms
without the intervention of the courts to relieve either party from the effects of a bad
bargain." Again the court in Hal Taylor Assoc, quoted Dalton v. Jerico
Construction Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) as follows: "It is not for a court to
rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the
bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable principles."
It is Florence's position that the agreement between the parties is not
unreasonable, commercially or otherwise. Florence was asked to loan $90,000.00
immediately, with no opportunity to do due diligence. The loan was unsecured.
Given the fact that Florence's funds constituted 90% of the funds placed at risk in
the REPC and the fact that Colbert recovered one million dollars from the
assignment of the property, it is not unreasonable for Florence to make a profit on
his investment of $90,000.00. There is no dispute that both parties to this agreement
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understood Florence's loan was intended as only of short duration. Yet the contract
provides that Florence stood to double his money if not repaid by October 24 '
when the project closed. It was therefore the intent of the parties that Florence
should recover a premium of $90,000.00 for a short term investment.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING COLBERT'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT REASONABLE AND
CONSISTENT WITH THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT AND THE
CONTEXT SURROUNDING ITS CREATION.
After narrating the positions of each of the parties, the trial court found that:
Colbert's interpretation of the Agreement's terms is reasonable and
more consistent with the language contained within the Agreement and the
context surrounding it's (sic) creation. Moreover, the Court finds that the
evidence supports Colbert's testimony because his actions were consistent
with his stated intention of acquiring and developing the Property (the project
and his stated understanding of the Agreement.... (R 520; Appendix "A")
The court noted, "Colbert testified that he entered into the Agreement

with Florence anticipating a typical 'hard money' lending arrangement in which he
agreed to pay points and interest for a short-term loan." (R 519; Appendix "A")
Appellant contends that this finding is contradicted by the express language of the
written agreement and by the clear weight of the evidence presented at trial and is
clearly erroneous.
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Evidence that Supports the Court's Finding (Marshalling).
After assigning the property, Colbert paid Florence $100,000. This payment
exceeds the interest rate term provided in the agreement. 4 At trial, Florence argued
that this showed Colbert's understanding that more than principal and interest were
due, but the court found this payment to be incorrectly computed interest plus an
attempt by Colbert to curry Florence's good will for possible future dealings. (TR
80; R 521) The appeals court, which did not observe the testimony of the
witnesses, cannot upset this finding. Florence's interpretation of the agreement
requires payment of $90,000.00 for what turned out to be a loan of 70 days.
There is no dispute that Colbert anticipated and worked toward the full
development of the subject property. (TR 60-62, 69-70, 85-86) The trial court was
clearly impressed by the effort put forth by Colbert to find, develop and finance the
property. Florence was made aware of these efforts during the negotiation of the
agreement between the parties. (TR 23) Both parties understood that at least one
method for closing the project would have been for Colbert to obtain long term
financial and proceed with the development of the project. Colbert testified that he
understood the phrase "close the project" to mean purchasing the property and
developing it. (TR 70, 85-86)
4

A 3 point amount would be $2,700, and 12% interest would be approximately
$3,676, as of November, 2005.
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The written agreement on which Florence's claim is based is not a model of
clarity or completeness. Although it claims to be an escrow agreement, no escrow
agent is required and the terms of the escrow are not set out. Neither party may be
held solely responsible for the ambiguity, since both participated in drafting the
agreement. It is possible that the phrase "earnest money agreement" could mean an
agreement to obtain moneys to be placed into escrow in connection with the REPC.
There was a direct conflict of testimony between Florence and Colbert about
whether a discussion of the possibility of "flipping" the property took place during
the negotiation of the agreement. Although the trial court made no specific finding
on this point, the ruling of the court must be understood to have found that no such
discussion occurred. The court, having observed the witnesses, must be sustained in
this finding. (R519)

Fatal Flaw
The fatal flaw in the court's finding is that it can only be reached if the court
ignores or gives no meaning to two of the major terms of the Agreement and
restricts the definition of "closing" to exclude the assignment of the property. The
clear weight of the evidence presented at trial show the trial court's finding on these
issues to be clearly erroneous.

The trial court found Colbert understood the
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agreement to be, "a typical 'hard money' lending arrangement5 in which he agreed
to pay points and interest for a short-term loan."(R 519) A finding that this
understanding is more consistent with the written agreement ignores the express
written term of the agreement which designate the agreement as an escrow money
agreement and establishes an agreed repayment date.

Escrow Money Agreement
Florence testified that Colbert's ability to return the loan for points and
interest was only available to Colbert if he and his partner decided not to go forward
with the project before the earnest money in the REPC became non-refundable. (TR
13-17, 19, 24, 33-40,49-50) Colbert admitted that he was aware of Florence's
understanding on this point. (TR 84-85) In other words, If Colbert withdrew the
earnest money and returned it to Florence before October 24, 2005, only points and
interest were due, but if the earnest money became non-refundable, so that
Florence's money was at risk in the project, the $90,000 premium became due. This
understanding makes sense of the term used to designate the agreement as an
5

No evidence of what a typical hard money lending arrangement might be was
presented at trial. Wikipedia defines the term in part as, "A hard money loan is a
specific type of asset-based loan financing through which a borrower receives funds
secured by the value of a parcel of real estate. This definition disqualifies Colbert's
claim.
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"escrow money agreement" and the specifying of October 24 as the "agreed
repayment date." Nothing about Colbert's interpretation of the agreement makes
sense of these express written terms.

Assignment as Closing
Florence testified that Colbert discussed the possibility of an assignment of
the property and assured Florence that he would be entitled to the $90,000.00
premium should that occur. (TR 12-13) Colbert admitted that he had lied in other
contexts to maximize his recovery in this project. (TR 82-83, 92) None the less, the
trial court's findings exclude assignment of the property as a method for closing the
project. Even assuming, however, that no discussion of "flipping" took place, it
does not necessarily follow that the assignment of the property cannot constitute a
closing of the project. It is clear that Colbert was aware of the potential for
assigning the property because he is designated as "Chad Colbert and or Assigns" in
the REPC. (R 28-34, 53-59, 212-218 and Appendix "B") There is no testimony
that the possibility of assigning the property for a profit was expressly excluded and
the written agreement certainly does not do so. Colbert executed a document
entitled closing statement in connection with the assignment of the property. (P 3)
He testified that the closing of the assignment was a closing. (TR 79, 87-89) The
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finding of the trial court that the assignment—and the closing connected with it—
was not a closing of the project is not supported by the evidence in the record.

Conduct of the parties:
Courts have given great weight to the parties contemporaneous practical
interpretation of the contract Hardinge Co., v. EIMCO Corp., 266 P.2d 494 (Utah
1954) Applying this criterion demonstrates that the weight of the evidence does not
support the finding of the trial court. Colbert's need for the loan was immediate.
Florence paid the money within twenty-four hours of Colbert's request. There was
no opportunity to do due diligence on the investment, nor was the loan secured in
any way. These are not circumstances which accompany the "typical 'hard money'
lending arrangement." Colbert did not ultimately purchase and develop the
property; he assigned it for one million dollars. Colbert's payment of $100,000.00
to Florence was not triggered by the agreed repayment date, but rather by the
closing of the assignment. After having assigned all of his interest in the subject
property, Colbert lied to his business partner about the closing, hoping to prevent
him from getting his share of the deal. (TR 82-83) Finally, when Florence called
Colbert to ask about the balance of his money, instead of telling Florence that he
had received all he was entitled to and more, Colbert lied to Florence, telling
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Florence that he had made more on this project than Colbert had. (TR 92) These
actions demonstrate that Colbert intended the assignment of the property to be a
closing of the project. The clear weight of the evidence demonstrates that the trial
court erred in finding the parties intended the agreement to be a typical hard money
loan.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this court construe the Agreement to
require Colbert to pay the $80,000.00 balance of the premium due as a result of the
assignment of the subject property. In the alternative, Appellant requests that the
court return the case to the trial court for the purpose of making findings regarding
the intent of the parties in light of the express contract terms not previously
construed by the trial court.

DATED this

1% day of August, 2010.
PETERSON & NYKAMP

-A

L.

/s/ Lawrence R. Peterson
Lawrence R. Peterson
Attorney for Appellant Casey Florence

19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of APPELLANT'S BRIEF was mailed to the
following this 18th day of August 2010:
Justin T. Ashworth (9474)
PRANNO ASHWORTH LAW, Pile
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
/s/ Lawrence R. Peterson
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APPENDIX "A

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 2 8 2010
SALT LAKM C d l J [ ^
•y.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

De ut c,e

^> *

IN AWD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CASEY FLORENCE,
FINAL RULING
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 070904712
TS.

CHADCOLBERT,
Judge Michele M. Christiansen
Defendant.
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The parties came for trial of the above-captioned matter on May 7,2009, and
thereafter submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw. Plaintiff Casey
Florence was present and represented by Lawrence R. Peterson and Bradley G. Nykamp.
Defendant Chad Colbert was present and represented by Justin T. Ashworth. The Court
considered the evidence and arguments presented at trial, the written submissions of the
parties, and the case authorities and entered its Ruling on August 10,2009. Thereafter,
Plaintiff Casey Florence (hereinafter "Florence" or "Plaintiff) filed an appeal
challenging this Court's dismissal of his claim. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal on December 17, 2009, because no final order was entered by the Court. On
December 29,2009, Plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure requesting the Court to either enter new findings of fact or conclusions of
law or hold a new trial on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to justify the

/ ^

Court's August 10, 2009 Ruling and/or that the Court made an error of law. Specifically,
Florence argues that the Court's "conclusion is not supported by the evidence at trial and
can only be reached if the Court ignores contract provisions and improperly imports into
the case a requirement that the agreement meets certain undefined standards of
'commercial reasonableness.'" He also contends that if the Court had applied the proper
contract interpretation principles,1 it would not have reached its conclusion. Defendant
Chad Colbert (hereinafter "Colbert" or "Defendant") filed an Objection to the new trial as
well as an Opposition Memorandum.2 Based upon the written submissions of the parties,
the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for New Trial3 and hereby enters its::

1

Such as interpreting the contract as a whole, harmonizing terms, and construing terms
by their ordinary meanings as opposed to the Court's alleged "restrictive" interpretation.
2

In his Objection, Colbert argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
the motion for a new trial because the Court of Appeals had not yet issued a remittitur pursuant
to rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 36(a)(2). After the
parties submitted their briefs and request to submit, the Court of Appeals issued the remittitur
(February 24,2010). Although Colbert was correct that this Court did not have jurisdiction at
the time of Florence's motion, it now does, and because Colbert filed an Opposition
Memorandum, it did not prejudice Colbert. Moreover, in his Opposition Memorandum, Colbert
first argues that Florence's motion is untimely filed. Florence had ten days after the entry of
judgment to file his motion. Florence's motion was not untimely filed—instead, technically, the
motion is improper because it concerns a Ruling that is not afinaljudgment. The court of
appeals held that his appeal was dismissed because the Court's August 10,2009 Ruling was not
a final order. However, it would be impractical and not serve any purpose for this Court to insist
that Florence re-file the motion upon the court's entry of a final order.
3

Under rule 59, if there was either insufficient evidence to justify the decision or there
was an error of law, the Court may (1) grant a new trial, or (2) if the action was tried without a
jury, "amendfindingsof fact and conclusions of law or make newfindingsand conclusions."
See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6)-(7). "Although a trial court has broad discretion to decide whether
to grant relief under this rule, a trial court must grant the motion if the "prior decision was
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Crestwood Cove Apts. Bus. Trust v.
Turner, 2007 UT 48, P40,164 P.3d 1247 (quotations omitted). On the other hand, the Court has
-2-

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff Casey Florence and Defendant Chad Colbert are residents of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
2. This case involves a written agreement entered into by Florence and Colbert on
September 21,2005, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, concerning certain real property
located in the State of Idaho (hereinafter "the Property").
3. The written agreement entered into by the parties, entitled "Escrow Money
Agreement," (hereinafter "the Agreement") provides:
This escrow money agreement between Chad Colbert & Greg Young ("the
borrowers") and Casey Florence ("the lender") is for $90,000 ninety

"no discretion to grant a new trial absent a showing of at least one ofthe circumstances specified
in Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)." Moon Lake Electric Assoc, Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western Constr,y Jnc.
161726 125, 128 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Consequently, the court may not amend the decision
unless it finds there was insufficient evidence to support it or if there was an error of law.
Conversely, the court must amend ifthere was (1) insufficient evidence or an error of law and
(2)findsthat it was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.
The Court does not believe it made an error of law in its original Tuling. The Court
determined the parties' intent based on the evidence and articulated their intent in its findings of
fact. Florence's argument that the Court should construe contract terms by their ordinary
meanings as opposed to their "restrictive" meanings is faulty. Utah courts have stated that
[i]n the construction of contracts . . . words which are used in
common, daily, nontechnical speech, should, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they
have for laymen in such daily usage, rather than a restrictive
meaning which they may have acquired in legal usage. In the
construction of contracts the purpose is to find and give effect to
the intention of the contracting parties.
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah 1982) (quotations omitted)
(interpreting the term "resident"); see also Mesa Dev. Co. v. Sandy City Corp., 948 P.2d 366,
369 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (same).
-3-

thousand dollars.
Terms:
Chad Colbert & Greg Young, jointly and severally promise to pay the
original amount of $90,000 together with interest at a rate of 12% annually
with a 3 point fee if the project is not closed by October 24,2005 which
date is the agreed repayment date. If borrowers close said project,
borrowers agree to pay the lender this original loan amount plus an
additional $90,000 (ninety thousand dollars), payable 14 days after closing.

4. The terms "project," "closed," "close," and "closing" are not defined in the
Agreement and the Court finds that each term is subject to differing interpretations.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Agreement is ambiguous.4
5. Despite reference to Greg Young as a "borrower," the Agreement was .entered
into and signed only by Colbert and Florence.
6. Although the Agreement refers to property in Council, Idaho, the parties agree
and the Court finds that the real property that was the subject of the Agreement is located
in Caldwell, Canyon County, Idaho.
7. Defendant represented to Plaintiff that he had the Property under contract and
asked Florence to loan him $90,000 in additional escrow money to secure the right to
purchase the Property.

"Under basic rules of contract interpretation, courts first look to the writing alone to
determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties." Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth
Corp., 2009 UT 2, P44,201 P.3d 966. It is "[o]nly where there is ambiguity in the terms of the
contract may the parties' intent 'be ascertained from extrinsic evidence.'" Giusti v. Sterling
Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, P44, 201 P.3d 966 (quoting Deep Creek Ranch, LLC v. Utah State
Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, P16, 178 P.3d 886).
-4-

8. During the conversation between the two men about the Agreement/ Florence
testified that Colbert represented to him that Defendant was desperately in need of a
short-term bridge loan to secure his right to purchase the Property, that this was a low-risk
investment for Plaintiff because Defendant had somebody lined up to whom he could
"flip" or assign the Property for u a million dollars in profit," that the $90,000 was soft or
refundable earnest money until October 24,2005, and that Colbert's intent was to develop
the Property but if his financing did not come through and Plaintiffs money became nonrefundable he would pay Florence back his $90,000 with 12% annual interest and points.
Florence testified that he understood his agreement with Colbert to be that the term
"projecf' in the Agreement meant to tie up the Property for sufficient time to obtain
financing or to flip the Property—basically doing anything with the Property to make
money—and that the term "close" meant finishing the "project" by taking possession of
the Property, obtaining financing for the development of the Property, or
flipping/assigning the Property.
9. Colbert testified at trial that prior to entering into the Agreement with Florence,
he signed a real estate purchase contract ("REPC") for the Property and that he and Greg
Young put down $10,000 in earnest money. The REPC signed by Colbert required that
he put down another $90,000 in thirty days to continue his purchase interest in the

5

Because of the Court's determination at trial and again in this Ruling that the
Agreement is ambiguous, the Court accepted extrinsic evidence at trial to determine the
intentions of the parties as to the rights and duties required by the Agreement.
-5-

Property. Colbert heard that Florence was interested in making the bridge loan he needed
to sustain the interest in Property and the two men talked on September 21,2005. Colbert
testified that during that conversation, he provided Plaintiff with a quick description of
the deal-the interest rate he would pay and his plans to develop the Property. Colbert
claimed that he did not discuss "flipping" or assigning the contract to anyone else during
his conversation with Plaintiff because at the time he was seeking the bridge loan from
Florence, Colbert was intending to purchase the Property for seven million dollars and
obtain additional financing to develop it. Colbert testified that it was only when he failed
to obtain the funding for buying and developing the Property that he met and assigned the
purchase contract for the Property to Kevin Howell for $ 1.045 million dollars. Colbert
testified that he believed he would owe Florence an additional $90,000, as described in
the Agreement, when he closed on and took possession of the Property and developed the
"project." Colbert anticipated that to purchase the Property and fully develop the project
would cost between ten and twelve million dollars. Colbert testified that he entered into
the Agreement with Florence anticipating atypical "hard money" lending arrangement in
which he agreed to pay points and interest for a short-term loan. Colbert understood the
agreement to be that he would pay Florence $180,000 if Defendant purchased the
Property and acquired the financing necessary to develop the project. Colbert understood
the term "project" referenced in the Agreement to mean a real estate development on the
Property and the term "close" to mean his purchasing the Property and obtaining the
financing for its development.
-6-

10. Plaintiff agreed to lend Colbert the $90,000. Both parties participated in the
drafting of the Agreement and on or about September 22,2005, after receiving Colbert's
signature on the Agreement, Plaintiff wired the $90,000 into an Idaho escrow account.
11. The Court finds that Colbert's interpretation of the Agreement's terms is
reasonable and more consistent with the language contained within the Agreement and
the context surrounding it's creation. Moreover, the Court finds that the evidence
supports Colbert's testimony because his actions were consistent with his stated intention
of acquiring and developing the Property (the project) and Ms stated understanding of the
Agreement, to wit:
a.

In the summer of 2005, Colbert located a tract of land in and around
Caldwell, Canyon County, Idaho that he believed as having great
development potential;

b.

Prior to entering into any agreement to purchase the Property, Colbert
sought to locate sources of financing for the purchase and development of
the project;

c.

Colbert declined the advances of Peterson Development to acquire the
Properly7 for its own purposes so that he could realize the profits from
developing the project himself;

d.

Colbert associated with Greg Young who provided the money for the initial
earnest money deposit and was to provide or arrange for financing for the
acquisition and development of the project;
-7-

e.

In August 2005, after providing a Capacity to Fund letter from Action
Creates Wealth to the seller of the Property to demonstrate his ability to
obtain ftmding for the development of the project, Colbert entered into the
REPC to purchase the Property;

f.

Throughout, Colbert continued to work toward development of the project.

g.

By late October 2005, the anticipated financing for the purchase of the
Property and the development of the project had fallen through and
Defendant began to seek other alternatives to defaulting on the REPC.

h.

Colbert assigned his right to purchase the Property to Kevin Howell
Construction, Inc. on November 3,2005.

12. Colbert never closed on the Property or the project as he was unable to secure
the financing required to complete the purchase of the land and the development of the
project. Defendant assigned his rights under the REPC to Kevin Howell Construction,
Inc. on November 3,2005. Colbert was paid a little over a million dollars for assigning
his purchase interest in the Property once Howell-Murdoch Development Corporation
completed the purchase of and closed on the Property on November 14,2005.
13. On or about November 30,2005, Defendant made out a check to Plaintiff in
the amount of $100,000, which check was delivered to Florence on or about December 5,
2005. This check represented Defendant's repayment of the $90,000 principle, plus
incorrectly calculated points and interest, along with an extra amount for future business.

-8-

14. Plaintiff filed the instant action against Colbert seeking judgment in the
amount of $80,000, plus interest, against Defendant.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Jurisdiction of this matter and venue are proper in the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2. Plaintiff and Defendant were parties to a written agreement wherein Florence
agreed to loan Colbert $90,000 and Colbert agreed to "pay the original amount of $90,000
together with interest at a rate of 12% annually with a 3 point fee if the project [wa]s not
closed by October 24,2005," and to pay the "original loan amount plus an additional
$90,000 (ninety thousand dollars)," if "borrowers close said project"
3. Because the written agreement between the parties is sparse and does not
contain definitions of key terms, specifically the terms "project" and "close," the Court
concludes that the words used to express the intention of the parties are insufficient so
that the Agreement may be and was understood to reach two different meanings. Thus,
the Agreement is ambiguous and, therefore, the Court must look to parol evidence to
determine the intent of the parties and the meaning of the Agreement.
4. From the evidence presented at trial, the Court concludes that the Agreement
meant that Plaintiff was entitled to the additional $90,000 if Defendant secured the
financing required to complete the purchase of the Property and the development of the
project. As Colbert did not close on the project (obtain the required financing to purchase
-9-

the Property and develop the project) but assigned his purchase interest in the Property to
Kevin Howell, Plaintiff was not entitled to the additional monies and was paid the amount
due under the Agreement.
5. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claim is dismissed.

This is the final Order of the Court-no other order need be submitted.

DATED this Ifj

day of March, 2010,

BY THE COURT:

Michele M. Christiansen
DISTRICT COURT JUDCjE
"CMS'

-10-
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RE-15 COMPENSATION AGREEMENT WITH BUYER

Hfflfl

T

•
9
TO
11

THIS IS A LEGALLY BINDING CONTRACT. BEFORE SIGNING, " f t f J K S P R
DOCUMENT^ INCLUDING ATTACHMENTS, IF YOU HAVE ANY j M g n O N ^
a ^ L T W U R A T T O I « E Y J U « M O R ACCOUMTAWT BEFORE SIGNING

E

i . BUYER Neme<»)
chrt ct^j^qzJ***^
8UYER tfesirei to purchase, leaee, or option the following reel estate* Type of property.
| | Residential i | Residential Income 1 | Commerasi X Vacant Land I I Other
Applicable area , Oty(s), County(a). Zip Cod«(s). etc
*** * Canyon
Other Descnption (ie, geographical area, price, ace)
and. where** the ynderalflned part.es desire to enter mto this formal agreement « £ » * • ^ T L ^ ^
paymeotfracelpt of arry real estate commission rasmtkiQ from the purchase and/or (ease of the above described type of propo
THIS » NOT A BROKER *£r*fMSSENTA*riO" A G R € G * £ N T , This * an agreement lor compensationforservicestaa *curtom
as d e f i n e d Idaho law. A c^iyerorseMerU
orsolleraiidlhetH»keraQe*reeina**>erete^
NotypeofBgetxyrepmeenteboamay
assumed by a brokerage, buyer or seller or created orally or by implication

12
13

Z
A G E N G Y D I S C L O S U R E C O N F I R M A T I O N : * " • ^ ^ * » received. has read, and understands the AGENCY
DISCLOSURE BROCHURE (prapered by the Idaho Rael Estate Commission.)

ia

3* T E R M O F A G R E E M E N T : The term of this Agreement shall commence on
.
tt.1S.06
and will espi*
11:59 p.m. an date
06«n5.06
, , or upon dotmgof escrow of such property per^atee throuQh this aoreemefi

IT
*
id
a

4 C O M P E N S A T I O N O F B R O K E R : Broker shall be compensated in the followtng ways: Check those that ^pa
I i K WthoamoortvtaeuMerttoaWo*^
MLS or otherwise, the Brokerage fee shall be the amount paid by the seller to the aforementioned Broke** out not less \t\
„
% of the gross selUnp price or $
dollars.

h

X
B. tf#tepcepQftvlaM«Mi»loetto^
sgraasthatOwdiolierwiibepeldefeeofnotlessllian
2 * of soiling pnoe or $
. The Broker shall feet saak
obtsin this fee through t i e transaction paid by the Seller. If thefeecannot be obtained through the Seller, the BUYER win
responiible for such fee stated above
»
7/
a
»
»
x

This compensation start apply to transactions made for whtcrt BUYER enters into a contract during the ordinal term of n
Agreement or euhng any eoension of such ongthel or esoended term, end shell « u e apply to transaction* for which BUYER en*
mto a contract within $ o „ days after tNs Agreement empires is terminated, if the property acquired by the BUYER was submitted
writing to the BUYER by Broker pursuant to Section One hereof during the original term or extension of the term of this Agreemc
Tna fee snail t * paw at c i c ^ u i t f e s a e t h e r w f c ^ ^
authorized to pay the above mentioned compensation at dosing.

a

& OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS:
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Ttmm
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mi
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